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EARLY YEARS
I first met Barry when he came to Manchester in 1973 as a 
postgraduate student to study for a PhD with Wolfe Mays, 
having completed his undergraduate studies in Philosophy 
and Mathematics at Oxford. I had then been studying phi-
losophy for just two years, having transferred into the sub-
ject as a postgrad after getting my own BSc in Mathematics 
at Manchester. Wolfe was also my supervisor, more by de-
fault than choice, because I had started out being interest-
ed in existential philosophy, and he was the go-to person 
in Manchester for that. Barry had enjoyed the benefit of 
an Oxford undergraduate education: the most impressive 
of his teachers, he said, was Michael Dummett, whose first 
big Frege book was just out. I was a tyro by comparison. 
Wolfe was Barry’s deliberate choice as supervisor, because 
he was interested in Husserl and phenomenology, which 
was off the Oxford radar, and Wolfe as founder-editor of the 
Journal for the British Society for Phenomenology was Mr. 
Phenomenology in Britain at that time. 
From the start, it was obvious that Barry was possessed 
of two characteristics that have stayed with him ever since 
and marked his career: a strong passion for the things that 
interested him, including of course but not confined to phi-
losophy, and an amazing capacity for sustained hard work at 
those things, which left the rest of us bobbing in his wake. 
When I say that neither I nor the third partner in our discus-
sions and enterprises, Kevin Mulligan, is particularly slow 
or sparse in our production, this may give some idea of his 
enviable fecundity as a writer, and latterly, as an ontological 
entrepreneur.
Barry is a native of Bury in Lancashire, a few miles north 
of Manchester, and on several occasions my wife Susan and 
I visited him in his house there. What I recall most vividly is 
the extent to which the house was dedicated to the storage 
of vast numbers of books. Bookshelves lined everywhere in 
the main room except doors and windows. When food or a 
bottle of wine was to be produced, books were moved and 
the required article brought out from behind them. We soon 
discovered our political differences: Barry was a Thatcherite, 
Susan and I were what he called ‘Guardian social demo-
crats’—The Guardian (formerly Manchester Guardian) being 
then, as it has remained, a left-leaning quality daily. This dis-
crepancy remains. Avoiding hard-left, hard-right, (and now 
hard-Brexit) views, I wobble around somewhere in what one 
might call, in analogy with chocolate, the Soft Center. We 
have long agreed to disagree about politics.
Barry’s energy exhibited itself not only in his cycling from 
Bury to Manchester, but also in his annual estival philo-
sophical pilgrimages about the continent of Europe. From 
these meetings he returned to Manchester with ideas and 
links from a range of places, most notably Germany, Austria, 
Switzerland and Poland. In Kraków he met the philosopher-
cardinal-archbishop Karol Wojtyła, whom I recall him de-
scribing as “probably some sort of saint.” This was before 
the latter was elected to the papacy. When Wojtyła’s philoso-
phy writings started to appear, we all decided he was a bet-
ter pope than a philosopher; religious phenomenology was 
not for us. However, realistic phenomenology was. It was 
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Barry who evangelized in our circle for Roman Ingarden, 
one of Husserl’s most talented students, and the one who 
most vigorously opposed the latter’s lapse into transcenden-
tal idealism. Barry also admired and praised Adolf Reinach, 
the leader of the Munich and Göttingen realist phenom-
enologists, and, together with Kevin and also the late Karl 
Schuhmann, exerted considerable effort to get Reinach’s 
work edited, documented and more widely known. Together 
with Karl he also publicized the work of the real instigator of 
the phenomenological movement as a movement, the bril-
liant but dysfunctionally perfectionist Johannes Daubert. 
Through their tireless editorial work, much of it channeled 
through Munich’s Philosophia Verlag, many of the less 
well-known figures of realist phenomenology have been 
made more accessible, especially to the English-speaking 
philosophical world, and the same goes for other central 
European realists such as Anton Marty, Brentano’s most 
faithful student, and Christian von Ehrenfels, the father of 
Gestalt psychology.
The most important connections Barry made in central 
Europe, at least for me, were in Austria. In Graz he met 
Rudolf Haller, whose conviction that philosophy in Austria 
had taken a different (and generally better) line of devel-
opment than in Germany (especially the former Prussian 
part—Bavaria was less affected by Kant and post-Kantian 
philosophy) was championed before Haller by Otto Neurath 
and after him by Barry. Kevin had independently arrived 
at a similar opinion, and I was readily persuaded. The oth-
er important Austrian connection was Edgar Morscher in 
Salzburg, of whom more is below.
Wolfe’s weekly seminars, which had always been fairly 
free-wheeling affairs, were turned by Barry, Kevin and my-
self into exercises in presentation and discussion on a wide 
range of topics, with no holds barred, and the three of us 
rather dominated proceedings. We were extremely direct 
and often rude in our criticisms of one another, which no 
doubt helped us to acquire thicker skins for the times ahead, 
to lend our discussions a direct style which has become 
moderately well-known in our circles, but also to align our 
views more closely. Even more than forty years later, we are 
able to predict one another’s views on more or less any phil-
osophical topic, because they are nearly congruent and the 
few differences obvious.
MOVING INTO CAREERS 
Barry’s PhD on reference in Frege and Husserl was a tour 
de force in bringing together these then rather disjunctively 
compared philosopher–mathematicians, and it brimmed 
over with interesting side-topics on such figures as Reinach, 
Ingarden, Schröder and Wittgenstein. It placed ontology sol-
idly in the center of philosophy, and pulled me over from the 
philosophy of language into ontology. After my doctorate I 
was working in the university library in Manchester, while 
Barry got a research fellowship in Sheffield. I then got a lec-
turing job in Bolton, which involved much teaching with 
little time for research. By the later 1970s, the three of us 
were keen to keep our philosophical seminars going, so with 
the support of Barry’s padrone in Sheffield, Peter Nidditch, 
we set up an informal grouping we called the Seminar for 
Austro-German Philosophy, which from March 1977 for 
several years held themed meetings around the UK, and 
occasionally abroad. The meetings were sparsely funded 
and depended mainly on enthusiasm from the participants. 
Many of the more senior figures Barry had encountered on 
his peregrinations were rounded up as Honorary Presidents. 
The people we had as speakers included not just established 
figures, who seemed pleased to participate, but also other 
younger upwardly mobile philosophers, and many a lifelong 
friendship resulted. The doctrinal line of the SAGP was that 
scientific philosophy in the 19th and 20th centuries did not 
coincide with analytic philosophy, important though that 
was, but included strands from Austria, Germany, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and occasionally elsewhere. By and large, 
that message has become available in print, although its re-
ception remains patchy; this is especially true among ana-
lytic philosophers, whose knowledge of central European 
thought is often confined to Wittgenstein, himself standard 
by no measure.
When Wolfe Mays retired as Reader in Manchester, Barry 
and I both applied for his position, and Barry got it. At the 
time I was put out, because Manchester was my home and 
I liked the eclectic mix of philosophies in the department. 
There was soon however a side-effect of the appointment 
which proved very advantageous for me. One of Barry’s 
Austrian acquaintances, Edgar Morscher, had just been ap-
pointed in 1979 as Full Professor (Ordinarius), which in 
the Austrian system brought two assistant positions with it. 
Edgar had Barry in mind for one, but Barry had just accepted 
Manchester and felt unable to let them down. Edgar turned 
at Barry’s suggestion to me: we had met in Manchester and 
Sheffield the previous year and had got on well. After tack-
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ing a visit to Salzburg onto the end of a summer trip to Italy 
(staying with Kevin and his wife) and Kirchberg-am-Wechsel 
(my first Wittgenstein Symposium—the fourth—Barry had 
been in on the second), I decided I’d like to try working in 
Austria and managed to persuade Susan to give up her work 
and come too. It was a huge change—and as it turned out, for 
my own work and career, massively advantageous. I learnt 
German, and got to know a whole new and partly alien set 
of institutions and practices, as well as enjoying the cultural 
and natural wonders of Salzburg city and its surroundings. 
Despite knowing about Austria and Austrian philosophy at 
arm’s length, I found the cultural shift involved challenging, 
but mostly very positive. Edgar became not only my Chef but 
also a close friend, and the department was outward-looking 
and welcoming. Employment conditions for foreigners were 
then not good: I had no permanent post and a lower salary 
than natives—this was before Austria joined the EU. Over 
the years, we slowly settled in: our children were born there, 
acquired both languages and went to school, and we made 
great friends. Teaching duties were modest, research was 
strongly supported and encouraged, the philosophers there, 
especially Paul Weingartner, had good connections, and 
the attractions of the city ensured a regular stream of good 
visitors. The stability of Austria at a time when Britain was 
undergoing socio-economic upheaval was welcome, and the 
position of the city in the centre of Europe facilitated easy 
travel to many philosophical destinations. In time I got my 
Habilitation and became an Austrian citizen, returning to 
Britain only in 1995.
In the meantime, Barry, Kevin and I were co-operating at 
long range on several projects, including the large edited vol-
ume Parts and Moments, to which I contributed three essays 
on aspects of formal ontology on which I had been working 
since Manchester days. Kevin and Barry wrote a magnificent 
introductory essay, ‘Pieces of a Theory’, which is a marvel of 
historical acumen and philosophical wisdom, as are their 
later essays in The Foundations of Gestalt Theory. Following 
the 1982 Wittgenstein Symposium we three put together a 
joint paper, ‘Truth-Makers’, which was published in 1984 
and helped to make that notion and the terminology (which 
we discovered had been invented independently by C. B. 
Martin) much more widely known and discussed. The term 
is new, but the notion is old: it is there in embryo in Aristotle 
(like so much else), is commonplace in medieval philosophy 
under the terminology of a proposition’s being verified for 
such and such items. Our immediate inspiration came from 
Husserl and Russell. (That one should be able without blush-
es to mention both in a conjunctive noun-phrase is part of 
the ideology of the SAGP.) Nowadays, instant telecommuni-
cation and exchange of drafts by e-mail is taken for granted, 
but in those days it involved three-way postal exchanges, 
which took much longer. Since that time, while Kevin and 
Barry co-authored several papers, I have only been involved 
in one other triauthorial piece, our short 2006 ‘What’s 
Wrong with Contemporary Philosophy?’, whose strongly 
critical tone we would all not only maintain but amplify in 
the light of later developments. In regard to what one might 
call Bad Philosophy, Barry and Kevin hold strongly evangeli-
cal views, and they have studied specimens of it under the 
title ‘nosology’. My own practice has been less intervention-
ist: when I encounter Bad Philosophy I tend to ignore it and 
get on with something else. Their practice is preferable, since 
it often helps to be told and shown why some things are bad, 
but I do support them from the sidelines. We all three signed 
the famous letter to The Times—drafted first by Barry—de-
ploring Cambridge University’s decision to award an hon-
orary doctorate to Jacques Derrida, and I still consider that 
opposition was right and justified. It helped the cause (but 
not the outcome) that we got famous names such as Quine, 
Armstrong, Marcus, Haller and Bocheński on board, all of 
whom have since sadly accompanied said Derrida into the 
Jenseits.
PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRUENCE IN BIG 
THINGS
Many of the philosophical opinions that I hold most tena-
ciously derived from discussions with Barry and Kevin. Of 
these, perhaps the most important is our implacable op-
position to any form of idealism, whether subjective, tran-
scendental, or other. I was always inclined to realism, but 
being around philosophers of language can mysteriously 
undermine one’s robust sense of reality, especially if one 
spends too much time trying to piece together what the lat-
er Wittgenstein was driving at. Out and out idealists in the 
fashion of Berkeley are few (though I have known some), as 
are latter-day absolute idealists (I met one once), but respon-
sibility for making a weaker, more insidious form of idealism 
acceptable, even normal, lies squarely with Kant, the philos-
opher who did more to ruin German-language philosophy 
than anyone before Heidegger, and whose influence will far 
outlast the latter. It is possible to write philosophy clearly, 
even beautifully, in German just as in other languages—
Bolzano, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Frege and Reinach stand 
as examples—but Kant’s enormous presence made it accept-
BARRY SMITH AND HIS INFLUENCE ON (NOT ONLY, BUT MAINLY MY) PHILOSOPHY
41
COSMOS + TAXIS
CO
SM
O
S 
+ 
TA
X
IS
 
able to write in tortuous sentences with poorly explained or 
inconsistent terminology, leaving those readers (the major-
ity) who flounder in their attempts to understand the Master 
vaguely worried that it’s their fault for being insufficiently 
“deep” to appreciate the subtle points being made. That has 
led historically, as Barry has pointed out, to a plethora of 
commentary literature, which is far less prevalent in ana-
lytic than continental philosophy, with the notable excep-
tion again of Wittgenstein. While our early inspiration came 
from Ingarden and other realist phenomenologists, we later 
found agreement with such unabashed analytical realists as 
Herbert Hochberg and David Armstrong, and it was with 
great pleasure that we discovered the trenchant and witty 
dismissals of idealism by David Stove.
Barry and I do not quite see eye to eye on matters onto-
logical—he is a realist about universals while I (like Kevin) 
am a nominalist; Barry is more of an Aristotelian, while I am 
more of a Whiteheadian—though we do all agree that it is 
incumbent on the ontologist, no matter how revisionary, to 
effect a meeting with the language and beliefs of the aver-
age person as well as the practicing scientist. This does not 
mean accepting or adopting common sense wholesale, but it 
does mean the onus is on the revisionist to provide positive 
reasons to think commonsense beliefs and ordinary ways of 
speaking are wrong or defective. An area in which Barry has 
made this stance very much his own trademark is his work 
on the application of formal ontology to database ontolo-
gies, to the extent that I frequently find myself calling BFO 
not “Basic Formal Ontology” but “Barry’s Formal Ontology.” 
The amount of common sense that he has instilled into IT 
ontologies and their practitioners is inestimable and admi-
rable. The work of clearing up the messes created by earlier 
conceptualist or idealist approaches to such ontologies has 
been very much in the mold of philosophical nosology. It is 
no wonder that BFO and other realist frameworks for on-
tologies, based on solid realist philosophical foundations, are 
proving ever more popular.
Barry has consistently combined philosophical depth with 
a concern to reach out and interact constructively with ex-
perts in other disciplines such as geography and medicine, 
an attitude of which I heartily approve and that I have in a 
smaller way followed in relation to and collaboration with 
engineering. The idea of a philosopher anchored in an arm-
chair, excogitating the structure of the universe a priori, is 
one which we both deride, and it would be otiose to need to 
mention that it has become obsolete since the scientific rev-
olution, were it not that so many philosophers tenaciously 
hold on to that view or some variant of it, (wrongly) anx-
ious no doubt that their discipline would render itself redun-
dant by merging into natural science. The concern to corral 
philosophy into a safe area beyond the reach of potential 
falsification or revision explains much of the appeal of tran-
scendental idealism. To see that philosophers continue to 
have a negative, critical role, it suffices only to read some of 
the more puerile would-be philosophical statements of even 
great scientists. However, a more positive impression of the 
empirically answerable but non-capitulative systematizing 
and structuring role of good philosophy can be gained by ex-
amining the framework of formal ontology for scientific and 
everyday knowledge crafted by Barry Smith.
